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inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate
court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

Ibid.

The trial court's

determination concerning a motion to dismiss or for a directed
verdict is a question of law.

State v. Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d

95, 110, 355 P.2d 689, 698-99 (1960), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 922,
82 S. Ct. 246 (1961).

The trial court's legal conclusion is not

accorded any particular deference and is reviewed for its
correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,

516 (Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990).
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault?

When

challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must show that the
evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted."
1983).

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah

"[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences

support the jury's findings, [the appellate court] will not
disturb them.
1985)."

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).

To

meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it
in the light most favorable to the verdict below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal the

2

evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of
insufficiency considered on appeal. J[d. at 738-39.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Danny L. Herring, was charged by information
with one count of obstruction of justice, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1990) (Count I), and
one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (Count II) (R. 1).
Defendant's case was tried before a jury.

Defendant made a

motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case, which was
preserved by the trial court (T. 330-31).

At the close of all

the evidence, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss, claiming
the State had failed to present a prima facie case on both counts
of the information (T. 423-39).

At the same time, defendant also

moved to dismiss or for a directed verdict, based on the evidence
that had been presented as a whole (T. 439-40).

The trial court

took all defendant's motions under advisement (T. 439-40).
The jury acquitted defendant of obstruction of justice
and convicted him of aggravated assault (R. 185-86).

Thereafter,

the trial court denied both of defendant's motions to dismiss and
for a directed verdict (Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative Motion for Directed Verdict of Acquittal,
3

attached at Addendum B, R. 207-08).

Defendant was sentenced to a

term of imprisonment, not to exceed five years, in the Utah State
Prison (R. 218-220).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of July 6, 1991, Troy Lott met his
friend, Kevin Ericksen, to help him in bringing some of the
Ericksen family's livestock to auction (T. 106). They were
accompanied by another friend, Scott Carlisle, with whom they
drank most of a case of beer in the course of the day (T. 107).
When they returned at about 3:00 to 4:00 p.m., defendant, a
friend of all three men, had already arrived at the Ericksen farm
(T. 108). Soon thereafter, the beer having been already
substantially consumed, defendant and Carlisle left to purchase
more alcohol, returning with a one-half gallon bottle of vodka
(T. 108-09, 335-37).
All four men, though Carlisle to a lesser extent,
proceeded to drink the vodka (T. 110-12).

Defendant testified

that he had less than a glass of vodka (T. 337-38).

In the

course of the afternoon the men engaged in a friendly water fight
amongst themselves and Ericksenrs young nieces and nephew, during
which time the bottle was consumed (T. 111-12, 338-40).
Carlisle left at about 5:00 p.m., at about which time
defendant and Ericksen got into a shoving match (T. 112-13).
Lott interceded, but Ericksen only continued to shove Lott in the
same way (T. 113). Feeling endangered, and seeing that Ericksen
would not respond to his requests to stop, Lott punched Ericksen
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twice in the face, knocking him to the ground (T. 113-14).

Lott

then felt two strikes from behind and turned to see defendant in
a fighting stance (T. 114, 140). Although Lott thought that
defendant hit him with his fists, Nicole Stickney, one of
Ericksen's nieces who had played in the water fight, testified
that defendant struck Lott by delivering two high kicks to the
back of Lott's head (T. 123, 170, 185-86).
Seeing himself outnumbered as Ericksen arose from the
ground, Lott ran to the Ericksens' pickup truck and jumped into
the bed of the truck (T. 110, 114). Defendant and Ericksen
jumped in right after him (T. 115). Ericksen repeatedly hit Lott
on his shoulders and ribs (T. 115). Although Lott did not recall
being hit by Ericksen in any other way, Nicole testified that she
saw Ericksen throw one of the fifty-gallon steel drums, weighing
thirty to forty pounds, that was in the truck down into the bed
(T. 147-48, 173-74).
As Lott lay on his side, hoping that Ericksen would
stop hitting him, he looked up at defendant, who then kicked him
straight in the face once and then within seconds a second time
(T. 115-17, 142-43).

Lott then jumped out of the truck and

headed down the lane, followed by defendant and Ericksen, until
he ran into Mike Morgan, Utah County Deputy Sheriff, who just
happened to be near the Ericksen property on another assignment
(T. 118, 124-25, 187-90).2

Lott had black eyes for a week after

1

Defendant's subsequent interactions with law enforcement
officials bear on the obstruction of justice charge. Since
defendant was acquitted of that charge and no issue relating to
5

the attack, though he acknowedged that he suffered no permanent
scarring or injuries and that he did not go to a hospital for
treatment (T. 119, 144).
Deputy Sheriff Morgan testified that Lott's face was
covered with blood and that he was bleeding "quite a bit"
(T. 191, 195). State's exhibits 2 through 5, photographs taken
the following day, depict Lott's facial injuries (State's
Exhibits 2 through 5; T. 87-88).

Detective Scott Carter of the

Utah County Sheriff's Office, who took the photographs, stated
that he considered Lott's injuries, "fairly major marks" (T. 96).
The State called Dr. Elmo Gruwell, emergency room
physician at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, as its expert,
non-treating physician to testify concerning the likelihood that
defendant's kicking Lott in the head would cause serious bodily
injury (T. 286-87).

Referring to exhibit 2, Dr. Gruwell

acknowledged that the injury shown in exhibit 2 was to the
forehead, the most protected area of the head (T. 298). However,
he also noted that the injuries depicted were "caused by a
significant force" and if applied to a different part of the face
could definitely have caused serious bodily injury (T. 306).
From exhibit 3, Dr. Gruwell noted that Lott had also suffered
injuries to his ear and temple, causing swelling in the area of
his temple (T. 306-07).
In response to a hypothetical question, Dr. Gruwell
testified to a variety of possible injuries and the consequences
it is raised on appeal, facts relating to it are omitted.
6

of blows to different parts of the face and head, including a
blow to the temple near the ear, the weakest portion of the skull
protecting the brain (T. 289-97).

Dr. Gruwell explained that the

middle menigeal artery might be sheared by such a blow which
could cause an epidural bleed, leading to death within twentyfour hours if not treated (T. 294). Treatment would require a
craniotomy or open brain operation, from which most people
survive but which leaves most with residual problems, including
seizure disorders or motor deficits on one side of the body, loss
of coordination and strength (T. 295).
Defendant testified that he kicked Lott in the back to
defend himself from Lott's first throwing a punch at him which
"scuffed" across his head (T. 342-43).

Deputy Sheriff Morgan,

however, noticed no signs on defendant's face that he had been in
a fight, but that defendant's knuckles were scraped and bore
contusions (T. 195-98).

Defendant also stated that he never

intended to do any physical harm and that his kicking Lott was
the result of his recovering his balance as he attempted not to
kick Lott but to deliver "a tap up the side of the head" (T. 349,
356-58).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The standard of review applied to determining whether
the trial court has properly denied a defendant's motion to
dismiss, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
jury's guilty verdict is essentially the same, i.e., does there
exist some evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

7

the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In this case the evidence supports both of these

challenges made by defendant on appeal.

There was evidence

showing that defendant intentionally kicked the victim directly
in the face and the temple, from which blows it was reasonably
likely that the victim could have suffered severe bodily injury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION
PRODUCED "SOME EVIDENCE" OF EVERY ELEMENT OF
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, WHICH WAS ALSO SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILT.
"A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires
the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed
with the introduction of evidence in his defense."

State v.

Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (citing State
v. Smith, Utah, 675 P.2d 521 (1983)).

See also Utah R. Crim. P.

17(o);2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990)3.

"In order to submit a

2

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in
pertinent part:
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by
the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or
any count thereof, upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any
lesser included offense.

8

question to the jury, it is necessary that the prosecution
present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause
of action."

Noren, ibid, (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah 1976)); State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
"[U]pon a motion to dismiss . . . for lack of evidence
[] the trial court does not consider the weight of the evidence
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the naked legal
proposition of law . . . . • •

Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355

P.2d at 698-99 (1960) (quoting State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d
281, 186, 272 P.2d 195, 198 (1954)).
"The controlling principle is that upon [a motion to
dismiss] the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the
state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting fairly and
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for
determination of the quilt or innocence of defendant."

State v.

Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 173, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960) (emphasis
added)•
A challenge alleging insufficient evidence to warrant
sending a case to the jury is reviewed under the same standard
applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a

3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990), provides:
When it appears to the court that there is
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to
his defense, it shall forthwith order him
discharged.

9

jury verdict.

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)

(cited for this proposition in State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561,
573-74 (Utah App. 1991):

"[The appellate court] will uphold the

trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate
court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

Ibid, (rejecting the

defendant's claim that the trial court had erred in denying his
motion to dismiss)).
Since the trial court's determination concerning a
motion to dismiss is a question of law, Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at
110, 355 P.2d at 698-99, it is subject to a correction of error
standard.

Citv of Monticello, 788 P.2d at 516.
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945),

the defendant had been charged with involuntary manslaughter
stemming from an automobile accident in which there was
conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant had recklessly
caused the accident.

The trial court granted the defendant's

motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case, and the
State appealed.

In finding the evidence sufficient to make out a

prima facie case and in reversing the trial court's ruling, the
majority stated the proper functions of the trial court versus
the jury:
When different reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, the question is one
exclusively within the province of the jury.
It is not the function of the court to
10

substitute its judgment on questions of fact
for that of the jury.
Id. at 68/ 157 P.2d at 260 (emphasis added).

This distinction

was developed at length in the concurring opinion of Justice
Wolfe, instructive in the instant case:
. . . The rule which must be applied upon a
motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all
reasonable inferences are to be taken in
favor of the state, and only if the record
itself reveals that no reasonable man could
draw an inference of guilt therefrom is the
trial court justified in taking the case from
the jury. No such situation is revealed by
this record.
So important is it that the above be
understood and that there be no confusion
regarding it that it may perhaps pay to
resort again to first principles. It is
common place in our system of jurisprudence
that the court decides only questions of law
and the jury questions of fact. Each has its
judging functions and each is an equally
important department of the judicial
institution we call the court. Neither is
supposed to trespass in the province of the
other. This is so fundamental that no
authority need be cited for it. In this case
it is requisite that we determine the line
separating the functions of each. Ordinarily
we sav that it is for the jury and not the
court to 'weigh' the evidence. That means
that where there is any substantial evidence
to go to the jury in favor of both sides it
must go to the jury so that the jury may put
all the evidence for one party on one scale
and balance it against the evidence for the
other party placed on the other scale.
•

• • •

The judge has very little to do with this
process. He determines whether offered
testimony has any probative force, i.e.,
whether it tends to prove or disprove an
element of the case and according to that
judgment he admits or rejects it. Once
admitted it is for the jury.
11

There are, of course, situations under
which the case should not be submitted to a
jury. One of these would be where there was
no substantial evidence (and that does not
mean a substantial amount of evidence but
substantial in the sense of having
substance). Perhaps also in the rare case
where there can be no doubt that testimony of
all witnesses as to one or more essential
elements in the case appears from the record
to be so inherently improbable that no
reasonable man could give weight to it the
case could be taken from the jury. But 'mere
contradictions of the testimony of a witness
will not suffice to constitute inherent
improbability or to destroy its weight' so as
to justify a court in disregarding such
testimony. Perhaps in the case where there
is a mountain of evidence on one side as
against a molehill on the other all of equal
quality as shown by the record so that no
jury of reasonable men could determine
otherwise than for the preponderance the case
might be taken from the jury, but the
preponderance would have to be overwhelming.
Also in criminal cases the case may be taken
from the jury where it can be said beyond
doubt that no reasonable men could find the
defendant guilty without entertaining a
reasonable doubt.

In determining whether or not a case is
to go to the jury, the trial judge has no
discretion. If the evidence falls into one
of the above enumerated categories the judge
should not submit it to the jury. If the
evidence under any reasonable interpretation
would sustain a verdict of guilty, the judge
is reguired to let the case go to the jury.
Id. at 74-78, 157 P.2d at 263-64 (Wolfe, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Defendant argued both at trial and in his written
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motion to dismiss* that the State had presented insufficient
evidence to make a prima facie case of aggravated assault,
relying only on authority in which the prosecution had failed to
prove that "serious bodily injury" had actually occurred, as
required under Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-103(1)(a) (1990), or its
predecessor statutes.5
* At the close of all the evidence defendant also moved for
a directed verdict of acquittal and, following the jury's
verdict, submitted only a written motion to dismiss (T. 439; R.
199-205). Neither the criminal code nor the rules of criminal
procedure provide for a "directed verdict of acquittal," though
rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does appear to
contemplate the trial court's right to enter a "judgment of
acquittal." Utah R. Crim. P. 23. But see State v. Striebv, 790
P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that Utah Code Ann. § 7717-3 (1990), and rule 17(o), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provide for a judgment of acquittal where the prosecution has
failed to present sufficient evidence for its case in chief);
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983) (holding that
motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings are
governed by sectionp 77-17-3 and rule 17(o)).
However, this Court has ruled that "[i]n Utah, a judge may
not acquit a defendant after a jury returns a guilty verdict."
State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1992). Thus, it
would appear that defendant received undeserved consideration in
the trial court's even considering his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal. In any event, defendant has not indicated
that any different standard would be applied to consideration of
his motion for a directed verdict than to his motion to dismiss.
Indeed, the unfortunate recognition of a "motion for a directed
verdict" in a criminal case, and the blurring of any distinction
between it and a motion to dismiss under section 77-17-3 and rule
17(o), under Striebv and Smith, make clear that both motions are
evaluated under the same standards.
5

See defendant's trial argument (T. 423-30) and Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 199-204), collectively citing
State ex rel. Besendorfer, 598 P.2d 742, 743-44 (Utah 1977) (no
serious bodily injury under section 76-5-103(1)(a) where victim
was struck in the face by the defendant with his fists,
sustaining bruises and tooth damage); State v. Kakarikos, 45 Utah
470, 474-77, 146 P. 750, 752-53 (1915) (finding an instruction
defining "great bodily harm" harmless where the instruction was
superfluous and the definition of assault was "an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability to commit a violent

13

In this case, however, defendant was charged with
knowingly and intentionally committing aggravated assault (R. 1),
and the jury so instructed (R. 175), only under subsection
(l)(b), which provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-1026 and he:

(b) uses . . . . other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.
In State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), the
defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault under
the same misapprehension as defendant in this case.

In Peterson,

the defendant was first charged only under section

injury on the person of another," and noting that such injury
could result from a beating with fists); State v. Harper, 761
P.2d 570, 571 (Utah App. 1988) (victim hospitalized for nine days
and permanently disfigured from husband's beating her with his
fists); State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1986)
(indisputable that victims beaten with a club and flashlight and
who were badly bruised and cut, one needing sixty-five stitches
in his head, suffered serious bodily injury); State v. Poteet,
692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1986) (victim beaten into unconsciousness
and who could have died, according to physician, sustained
serious bodily injury).
6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990), provides, in pertinent

part:
(1) Assault is:

(c) an act, committed with unlawful
force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another.
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76-5-102(1)(a), which requires proof of serious bodily injury.
On the second day of trial the court granted the State's motion
to amend the information so that subsection (l)(b), rather than
(l)(a)/ would be the basis of the aggravated assault charges.
The defendant in Peterson claimed that the evidence did
not support a conviction, relying on arguments very similar to
those made by defendant on appeal in this case, i.e., the victim
had not sustained any serious bodily injury because she did not
require any medicial attention after the assault, nor did she
suffer any permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of bodily
function.

.Id., at 1218-19.

In rejecting the defendant's claim

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reduce the
charges to simple assault, the Utah Supreme Court held:
It is not necessary to prove that death or
serious bodily injury occurred, but only that
the actor used means or force likely to have
that result. The record shows that defendant
attacked Sandra Dotson, placed his hands
around her neck and applied sufficient
pressure to cause her to black out. Such
force clearly could have caused the death or
serious bodily injury of Mrs. Dotson and was
therefore sufficient under the statute. It
is not necessary to prove that death or
serious bodily injury occurredr but only that
the actor used means or force likely to have
that result. The record shows that defendant
attacked Sandra Dotson, placed his hands
around her neck and applied sufficient
pressure to cause her to black out. Such
force clearly could have caused the death or
serious bodily injury of Mrs. Dotson and was
therefore sufficient under the statute.
Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
In this case both Lott and Nicole Stickney, an
impartial witness, testified that defendant first struck him
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twice in the head from behind (T. 114, 170). When Lott tried to
escape defendant pursued him and then kicked him twice directly
in the face (T. 114-17).

Dr. Gruwell testified that Lott had

sustained at least one blow to his temple, evidenced by injuries
to Lott's ear and the swelling in his temporal region, and that
such a blow could have caused serious bodily injury, requiring
Lott to undergo an open brain operation and leaving him with
residual neurological problems (T. 194-95).

Gruwell also stated

that a blow to the temple could cause arterial bleeding leading
to death within twenty-four hours if not treated (T. 294 ). 7

On

such facts, viewed most favorably to the State, the jury might
reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had assaulted Lott by means or force sufficient to
cause serious bodily injury.

Therefore, the trial court properly

submitted the case to the jury.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict,
a defendant must demonstrate to the reviewing court that the

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990) defines "serious bodily
injury:"
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial
risk of death.
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evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted."
1983).

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah

In undertaking such review, the appellate court will

"view the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it,
in the light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Moore, 802

P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).

"[S]o long as

some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's
findings, [the court] will not disturb them.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)."

See State v.

Ibid.

As noted above,

this standard is the same as that applied to a motion to dismiss.
See Dibello, 780 P.2d 1225.
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal.

Moore, 802 P.2d at

738-39.
In this case defendant fails to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, i.e., Dr. Gruwell's testimony as
to the signficance of the blows Lott suffered and the serious
injury and possible death which might have resulted from the blow
to the temporal region of Lott's head.

Such evidence and the

reasonable inferences from it, as argued in Point I of this
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brief, when viewed most favorably to the jury's verdict, is not
so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a reasonable juror
must have had a reasonable doubt about defendant's using force or
means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

Therefore,

this Court should not disturb the jury's verdict on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
DATED this

/

day of March, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
/^Y
i>L-4)y^~X~e>^
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1990)
76-1-601
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creeates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial
risk r* death.
76-5-102
(1) Assault is:
•

• • •

(c)
committed with unlawful
force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another
76-5-103(]){ )
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if 1le
commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he:
• • • •

(b) uses . . . . other means or force
likely to prt minn i < death or serious bodi ly
injury.
77-17-3
When it appears to the court that there is
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant
his defense,, it shall forthwith order him
discharged.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule "
(<
" the conclusion of the evidence by the
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the
evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or
any count thereof, upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any
lesser included offense.
Rule 23
At ai ly time prior ; w,u imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved «
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew
or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just
and proper under the circumstances.
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
n

STATE

iiF UTAH

:

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL

Plaint!It,

Case No. 911400406
: Judge Ray M. Harding

DAN L. HERRING,
DOB: 12-18-68
Defendantf~x

r

(nit In-1 hearing

on Defendant's Motioi ^

Dismiss

the alternative Motion for

Directed Verdict of Acquittal on March 20, 1992 before the
Honorable Ray M. Harding.

The state app*

by Deputy Utah County Attorneys John I
Ilii I
l I" i
n i" II 11

>

d

Allan and Phillip W.

^fendanl appeared and was represented by counsel

I * John Musselman.

The Court, having received and react

memorandum of both parties, entertained the arguments of counsel,
^emises

n i.
,
- makes the following

Ruling:
t

Aggravated

-*

established a prima facie case for

2.

That the evidence offered for each element of the

offense charged was such that reasonable minds could find all the
elements of the crime charged in favor of the State.
3.

That the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the charge of

Aggravated Assault is denied.
4.

That the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict of

Acquittal with respect to the charge of Aggravated Assault is
denied.
DATED this

7

Approved as to form:

v

B^Zoohn Musselman
Attorney for Defendant

day of /&&**<£

, 1992.

